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STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND
FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS-1932-1935
ROBERT C. BROWN *
T IS well known that the Federal Constitution gives to Congress the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes." '
This clause of the Constitution (usually referred to as the
"Commerce Clause") is one of the most important provisions of
the original Constitution. In fact, one of the chief purposes of
forming our national government was to give Congress this
power, and thus put a stop to a very frequent and vicious feature of the old confederacy, namely, interference by the different
states with commerce involving other states or countries. It
will be noted that the clause covers not only commerce involving
more than one state (interstate commerce in the strict sense),
but also commerce with the Indian tribes, and also foreign commerce. Commerce with the Indian tribes is today of comparatively slight importance, but foreign commerce still remains of
considerable consequence. The power of Congress is exactly the
same with respect to foreign and Indian commerce as it is with
respect to interstate commerce in the strict sense; and no distinction can justifiably be made, or has in fact been made, with
respect to these different kinds of commerce within the regulatory power of Congress. In this article, following a usual and
convenient, if somewhat inaccurate, practice, the phrase "interstate commerce" will be used to cover not only commerce between
the states, but also foreign commerce and, if need arise, commerce with the Indian tribes.
* A.B. Wesleyan University; LL.B., S.J.D. Harvard University; Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School; author of The Taxation of
Indian Property (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 182, Restrictions on State Taxation because of Interference with Federal Functions (1931) 17 VA. L. REV.
325, and State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and State and Federal
Taxation of Intergovernmental Relations-190-1932 (1933) 81 U. OF PA.

L. REv. 247.
'Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3.
2

See also Railroad Co. v.
GA'vr, THE COMMERCE CLAusn (1932).
Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 469 (1877); Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S.245, 248
(1929).
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All that is said in the Constitution is that Congress has power
to regulate such commerce. From this, it would certainly not
follow that the states are precluded from similar regulation,
though some court decisions have seemed to indicate an idea
that such is the case. 2 However this may be, it is entirely certain that the states may not discriminate against interstate commerce (in the broad sense previously explained), nor may they
unreasonably burden it. The court decisions to this effect are
innumerable. Furthermore, it is a fair inference from the commerce clause that any state power to regulate such commerce is
clearly subordinate to the power of Congress.
The mere words of the commerce clause, however, certainly
do not demand, even if they possibly justify, the ruling that
states may not burden, or discriminate against, interstate commerce. The correctness of the numerous decisions of the Federal
Supreme Court to that effect is, however, hardly doubtful. As
already pointed out, one of the primary purposes of the formation of our national government was to put an end to such
interferences by the individual states. To construe the commerce clause as including a prohibition against such state interference is, therefore, reasonable, and in accordance with the
intent of the makers of the Constitution. Furthermore (and
this is the problem with which we are definitely concerned here),
such improper interference by the states may be through taxation as well as by other methods.
But another restriction upon the power of the states also
merits consideration. This is, that the states may not burden the
functions of the Federal Government. And conversely, the
Federal Government may not burden state functions. For
neither of these well-settled propositions is there even a shadowy
verbal justification in the terms of the Constitution, as is the
case with respect to interstate commerce. The truth is that this
whole doctrine is purely a judicial invention, but one which is
believed to be both theoretically and practically justified. Even
the original terms of our Constitution clearly contemplated a
dual form of government, with both nation and states existing
and operating effectively in their respective spheres. The very
early Tenth Amendment also reenforces this theory. 3 And it
3 This amendment, ratified in 1791 as one of the original ten amendments to the Constitution, provides, "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively or to the people."
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is entirely evident that such a dual form of government is workable only if in governmental relations the respective members of
the partnership-the nation and the several states-are restricted from burdening, and thereby potentially destroying, the
operations of the other. It is possible that the Federal Government has somewhat greater powers to interfere with the states
4
than have the states to interfere with the Federal Government,
but, in general, the Federal Supreme Court has wisely striven to
keep a perfect balance between states and nation.
Again it is obvious that such prohibited interference may be
accomplished by sundry methods; but the method of taxation,
with which we are here concerned, is certainly not one of the
least effective. It is, in fact, one of the most frequently usedand condemned. We are concerned, then, with the rule that the
states may not unreasonably burden interstate commerce in the
broad sense by taxation, and that neither the states nor the
nation may impose taxes which unreasonably burden the functions of the other.
However, the word "unreasonably" is used advisedly, for any
statement of the rule which left out this word (even though such
statement occasionally appears in judicial opinions) would be
merely ludicrous. For example, if it were the law that no state
could impose a tax which by any possibility imposed a burden
upon interstate commerce, the states would be precluded from
imposing any corporation or excise taxes, as all such would affect
interstate business and, therefore, would burden interstate commerce. In fact, we may go further and say that the states could
impose no taxes at all, for even a land tax may burden activities
upon the land, and such activities- may affect interstate commerce. Furthermore, a rule that the states could not impose
any tax in any way affecting the Federal Government would
have a similar result. And conversely, a rule that the Federal
Government could impose no tax in any way affecting state
functions would wipe out one hundred per cent of the federal
taxing power.
Fortunately, the Federal Supreme Court, which is, of course,
the supreme authority in this matter, whatever it may at times
have said, has rarely in fact attempted to enforce rigid rules
bringing about such utterly impossible results. The problem is
4 See Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
435-436 (1819).
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a practical one, and is necessarily one of adjustment rather than
complete prohibition. The Court has at times taken the position
that the prohibition of taxes affecting the other member of our
dual system of government is more rigid than the restriction
upon the power of the states to impose taxes affecting interstate
commerce; 5 but the truth seems to be that the problem is essentially the same in both cases. For reasons already pointed out,
complete rigidity would result in the destruction of both the
state and Federal Government. The problem lacks the dramatic
force of the important constitutional questions now arising out
of the unprecedented activities of the Federal Government during the present administration; 6 but basically it involves the
same contention as to what are the proper respective spheres of
activity of the nation and the states.
Since this is a problem of practical adjustment, it is one
which recurs constantly in different forms. This means that it
has never been settled in all its aspects, and very probably never
will be. However, as in other branches of constitutional law,
the piling up of precedents has at least delimited the field of
judicial and practical uncertainty. This has been going on since
the beginning of our government, but the tax problem has become more serious, if anything, in the last decade or so. Accordingly, we find that contemporary decisions on this point are
quite numerous and are of enormous importance1 It is the purpose of this article to consider Supreme Court decisions upon
state taxation affecting interstate commerce, and federal and
state taxation in intergovernmental relations during the three
terms of the Supreme Court beginning in October, 1932, and
ending with the close of the October, 1934, term.
5 See, e. g., Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922), where the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, said at p. 505, "The criterion
of interference by the States with interstate commerce is one of degree. It
is well understood that a certain amount of reaction upon and interference with such commerce cannot be avoided if the States are to exist and
make laws. . . . The rule as to instrumentalities of the United States on
the other hand is absolute in form and at least stricter in substance."
6
See, e. g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 494
(1935).
7 See, for a discussion of the earlier authorities on the topics of this
article, Brown, Restrictions on State Taxation because of Interference with
Federal Functions (1931) 17 VA. L. Rav. 325; State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and State and Federal Taxation in Intergovernmental

Relations-1930-1982 (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 247.
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The Interstate Commerce Cases
The first problem with regard to interstate commerce is
obviously as to what may be regarded as such commerce. It is
certain that there may be facilities for such commerce which
are not themselves commerce, and therefore have no immunity
from state taxation.
This problem was presented to the Court in a case involving
the question of the power of the state of Michigan to impose
a franchise tax upon a domestic corporation, the sole asset of
which was an international bridge between Michigan and
Canada." The contention of the taxpayer was that it was immune from tax, upon the ground that its only asset was a facility
of foreign commerce, and that, accordingly, such a tax would
effect a direct burden upon that commerce. The Court dismissed
this contention on the short ground that the certificate of incorporation of the taxpayer gave it broader powers than the construction and maintenance of the bridge in question, and that,
therefore, it could not be shown that its franchise was restricted
to the maintenance of a facility of foreign commerce. However,
in the second appeal of the same case,9 nearly three years later,
the taxpayer had removed any basis for this decision by amending its charter so as to restrict its powers to the operation of
the bridge.
However, the taxpayer was again denied relief, on the theory
that the maintenance of the bridge was not engaging in foreign
commerce. The Court relied upon a much older case 1 0 where it
was held that a state could impose a property tax upon that portion of an interstate bridge situated within the state, nothwithstanding the fact that the bridge was a facility of interstate
commerce and could be used only for that purpose. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court said:
"Clearly the tax was not a tax on the interstate business carried
on over or by means of the bridge, because the bridge company did
not transact such business. That business was carried on by the persons and corporations which paid the bridge company tolls for the
privilege of using the bridge. The fact that the tax in question was
8 Detroit Internat'l Bridge Co. v. Tax Appeal Board of Mich., 287 U. S.

295 (1932).
9 Detroit Internat'l Bridge Co. v. Tax Appeal Board of Mich., 294 U. S.
83 (1935).
10 Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150 (1897).
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to some extent affected by the amount of the tolls received, and therefore might be supposed to increase the rate of tolls, is too remote and
incidental to make it a tax on the business transacted." "1

Obviously, this language is applicable, and indeed conclusive,
with respect to the situation in the Michigan case. However,
the very language which has been quoted is an admission that
such a tax does to some degree burden interstate, or foreign,
commerce, as the case may be. Presumably, the tax must be
paid out of tolls collected for passage over the bridge, and therefore, in theory, such tolls would be lessened if the state were
precluded from collecting the tax. A sardonic, but probably
accurate, answer to this argument would be that the tolls are
put at all the traffic will bear, and would not actually be reduced
if the tax were not collected from the owner of the bridge. Be
that as it may, these cases are sufficient proof that the Court is
continuing its previous very wise practice in dealing with this
problem. Often, it purports to decide the case before it by relying upon some technical distinction (as in this case, between a
facility of commerce and the commerce itself), but in the last
analysis, the problem is not whether or not the state tax theoretically, or even actually, burdens such commerce (for it nearly
always does), but whether such burden is really substantial.
This consideration is made even more explicit in the case of
Liggett v. Lee,12 which upset a chain store tax imposed by the
state of Florida upon grounds not here applicable. The Court,
however, refused to accept the taxpayer's argument that the
chain-store tax was necessarily invalid, as a burden upon interstate commerce, merely because more chain store dealers buy
from wholesalers from outside the state than do individual
dealers. The answer was made that, assuming the truth of this
statement, there was no intentional discrimination by the state
against interstate commerce, and that the burden was trifling.18
Growing out of the problem of taxing directly or indirectly
the facilities of interstate commerce, is the problem of taxing
such property as railroad cars and similar assets which actually
move in interstate commerce. In one sense, these are mere
facilities of such commerce, but their relationship to the com11 Id. at 153.
12 288 U. S. 517 (1933).
13 Id. at 538-539.
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merce actually carried on is obviously much closer than a mere
right of way.
The Court, by its decision in Joknson Oil Refining Co. v.
Oklahoma, 14 adhered to its opinion many times previously
reiterated, that cars may be taxed by a state where they are,
even though their usual, or perhaps, sole use is in interstate
commerce. Here the plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, had an oil
refinery in Oklahoma at which all its tank cars were loaded and
to which empties were returned. The cars were used in interstate commerce, and each car was in Oklahoma only a small part
of the time. The chief problem was as to the extent of the tax,
which was limited by the Court to the average number of cars
in Oklahoma during the year; !' but the Court, nevertheless,
refused to accept the taxpayer's argument that the cars were
wholly exempt from tax, on the ground that they were used
exclusively in interstate commerce. The Court, speaking by
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, said as to this:
"The basis of the jurisdiction is the habitual employment of the
property within the State. By virtue of that employment the property

should bear its fair share of the burdens of taxation to which other
property within the State is subject." 16

Here again we have the Court sustaining a state tax which is
a burden on interstate commerce-strietly limited, to be sure,
but a burden nevertheless. And in Virginia v. Imperial Coal
Sales Co., 1 7 the Court applied the same principle to intangible
property within the state, but shown to be used solely in interstate commerce, because the owner's activities were exclusively
such commerce.
The next step is a consideration of the power of the states to
tax property which is, or at least alleged to be, not merely
moving in interstate commerce, but actually the subject thereof.
As to this problem, probably the most important case in this
18
period is Minnesota v. Blasius.
14 290 U. S. 158 (1933).
15 See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891);
Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919).
16290 U. S. 158, 162 (1933).
17293 U. S. 15 (1934).

18290 U. S. 1 (1933).
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In this case the plaintiff was a trader in live stock in Minnesota. On the tax day, he had there cattle which had been shipped
from outside Minnesota, and which he expected to sell and ship
outside the state, as he, in fact, actually did later. The cattle
were subjected to local property taxation in Minnesota, and the
Court held that this was proper.
The chief argument which the plaintiff had in this case was
that cattle so handled were within the "stream of commerce"
and therefore subject to federal regulation for purposes of antitrust activities and for protecting agriculture.19 On this basis,
he argued that the cattle must be considered to be the subjects
of existing interstate commerce, and, therefore, immune from
taxation by the states. However, the Court had already held
that cattle thus in the "stream of interstate commerce" may,
nevertheless, be subjected to non-discriminatory property taxation by the states.2 0 And in this case it adhered to the same
view, stating very expressly:
"But because there is a flow of interstate commerce which is subject to the regulating power of the Congress, it does not necessarily

follow that, in the absence of a conflict with the exercise of that power,
a State may not lay a non-discriminatory tax upon property which,
although connected with that flow as a general course of business,
has come to rest and has acquired a situs within the State." 21

The same doctrine was applied in Federal Compress Co. v.
McLean.2 2 Here the basis of the state tax was cotton which
was in the hands of the plaintiff company for the purpose of
compressing and forwarding it by railway to other states. The
plaintiff had been expressly designated as the railway agent for
this purpose. The tax was not strictly a property tax, but was
a license tax measured by the amount of property. The Court
recognized, however, that the tax burdened the property, but
held that such property was within the taxing power of the state,
though it was being held by the plaintiff solely for the purpose
of being shipped in interstate commerce. In fact, the case was
19 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905); Stafford v.
Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S.

1 (1923).
20
Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 (1913).
21290 U. S. 1, 8 (1933).
22291 U. S. 17 (1934). See also, Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U. S.
584 (1934).
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somewhat easier than Minnesota v. Blasius,23 because the cotton
had been grown in the same state and as yet had not entered
interstate commerce. 2 4 But here, too, there is a burden upon
interstate commerce, but one which is not merely non-discriminatory but also not really very heavy.
Another form of state taxation affecting interstate commerce
is a tax upon the use of commodities within the state, even
though such commodities have been produced outside the state
and, therefore, brought within it by some form of interstate
commerce, and even though they are actually used exclusively in
carrying on interstate commerce. Here, too, the federal courts
generally sustain the tax, in the absence of substantial discrimination.
This principle, while applied to various commodities, 25 has
its most frequent application with respect to gasoline. As to
this, probably the leading case during this period was Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace.26 The plaintiff
railroad company was engaged mainly in interstate commerce
and, therefore, objected to an excise tax imposed by Tennessee
upon the use of gasoline within the state, measured by the
amount so used. The argument was that while the use was in
Tennessee, yet that was only a step in interstate commerce, and
that, accordingly, such commerce was burdened. The Court
rather clearly admitted the theoretical soundness of this argument, but sustained the tax as a matter of degree, stating that
the burden, while existing, is not direct or heavy. It said:
"But interstate rail carriers are not wholly immune from other
forms of non-discriminatory state taxation, even though the burden

of the tax is thus indirectly or incidentally imposed upon the interstate commerce in which they are engaged. It cannot be doubted
that, when the gasoline came to rest in storage, the state was as free
to tax it, notwithstanding its prospective use as an instrument of
interstate commerce, as it was to tax appellant's right of way, rolling

23290 U. S. 1 (1933).
See Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886).
25
Thus, a state tax on the sale of oleomargarine was sustained in
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S.40 (1934). In applying the tax, no
regard was paid to whether or not the oleomargarine was manufactured
in the state.
26 288 U. S. 249 (1933).
24
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stock or other instruments of interstate commerce, which are subject
to local property taxes."

27

A similar Wyoming statute was upheld, and upon similar reasoning, in Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport,6 the tax here
being applied to gasoline used in aeroplanes flown exclusively in
interstate commerce.2 9 And the same result was reached with
reference to a Louisiana statute of the same nature, and applied
30
in a similar manner.
The Iowa tax sustained in Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson,31
was very similar in substance, though somewhat different in
form. Here, all gasoline brought into the state was subjected to
the tax,3 2 but a refund was given of that part of the gasoline sent
out of the state. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Roberts, reached the sensible conclusion that the practical result
of this scheme was to tax only that gasoline used in the state, 33
and that the tax could, therefore, be sustained upon the same
reasoning that has already been summarized.
Gasoline taxes have been traditionally imposed as compensation for the use of the roads by motor carriers. As has already
appeared, however, they may be sustained even though the user
of gasoline does not use the roads, as in the case of aeroplanes.
However, it still remains true that the states may exact a tax
from persons using the road, though in interstate commerce,
providing the tax is at least roughly proportionate to their use
of the roads.
On this point, the leading case during the period under consideration is Hicklin v. Coney.3 4 Here, a South Carolina tax
27 Id. at 267. It should be noted that this same Tennessee tax had
already been before the Court in an appeal from the decision in American Airways, Inc. v. Wallace, 57 F. (2d) 887 (M. D. Tenn. 1932), which
upheld the tax. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision without opinion,
287 U. S.565 (1932).
28289 U. S.249 (1933).
29 See Eastern Air Transp. Co. v. South Carolina Tax Com., 285 U. S.
147 (1932).
30

American Airways v. Grosjean, 3 F. Supp. 995 (E. D. La. 1933),
af'd without opinion, 290 U. S. 596 (1933).

31292 U. S.86 (1934).
32 To tax gasoline not produced or used in the state would be an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. Helson v. Kentucky, 279
U. S.245 (1929).
33
C f. General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U. S.367 (1926).
34290 U. S.169 (1933).
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imposed on carriers by motor vehicle was upheld, even though
the plaintiff was engaged solely in interstate commerce. The
tax was graduated, and based upon the "carrying capacity" of
the vehicles. The tax was spent exclusively for the construction and maintenance of roads, which the plaintiff used, though
with no settled route.
The chief difficulty of the Court, however, was to distinguish
this case from Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 5 where the
Court had invalidated a Tennessee tax upon interstate motor
busses, upon the ground that it was not reasonably proportioned
to the use of the roads and was, therefore, an improper burden
upon interstate commerce. The Tennessee tax was graduated
and based upon carrying capacity-the same basis as the South
Carolina tax now upheld. The Court, however, distinguished
the cases upon the ground that the South Carolina tax was used
exclusively for roads, whereas the Tennessee tax was not.
It is submitted that this distinction will not do. It can hardly
be said that a state must use all of the taxes which it exacts for
the use of its roads, upon the roads. The real question is
whether the tax is reasonably proportioned to the use made of
the roads. No doubt the use of the tax money by the state has
some evidentiary bearing upon the subject, but it is not conclusive. The truth seems to be that the test of carrying capacity
usually has a reasonable relation to the use of the roads, particularly where the taxpayer does not follow a prescribed route. 36
It is probable, therefore, that this case really overrules Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, at least on this particular point.
A similar, but somewhat less important, case is Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia,37 where a state tax on private
carriers of $25 for each vehicle was upheld as applied to a carrier engaged solely in interstate commerce. Here, too, the entire
tax was to go to the road fund. The plaintiff claimed that interstate commerce was discriminated against because, as he alleged,
local carriers use the roads in the state more than interstate
carriers. The Court's answer was that there was no real discrimination in fact, as the question of how much the plaintiff
used the roads was a matter solely in its own discretion.
35283 U. S. 183 (1931).
36 See Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 402 (State Taxation of Motor Vehicles

Engaged in Interstate Commerce).
a7 295 U. S. 285 (1935).
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As already pointed out, even a corporation tax imposed upon
a corporation engaged in interstate commerce does, to a greater
or less degree, burden such commerce. Usually, the burden is
too slight or indirect to result in the invalidation of the tax.
But in the important case of Anglo-Chilean Corp. v. Alabama,38
a state tax was invalidated upon this ground.
The plaintiff was a New York corporation engaged in importing nitrate into Alabama, the nitrate being sold only in
original packages. The plaintiff had secured permission to do
business in Alabama, but in fact did no other business than that
already stated. It was held not subject to an Alabama tax on
the capital of foreign corporations employed in Alabama, on the
ground that it was doing no intrastate business in Alabama, but
was engaged only in foreign commerce. The opinion, by Mr. Justice Butler, relied upon certain previous decisions of the Court,3 9
to the effect that a state has no power to tax a foreign corporation whose only activities within the state are in interstate commerce, or directly connected therewith. The first decision in the
Detroit InternationalBridge Company case 40 was distinguished
on the ground that the Alabama statute confined the tax to cases
where business was actually done.

While the cases already cited 41 do justify the result in this
case, the decision is not very satisfactory. In all these cases,
the measure of the tax is concededly valid, and the tax could
probably be sustained in full if the corporation performed any
activity in the state apart from interstate or foreign commerce,
no matter how trifling. Furthermore, the tax is not discriminatory and does not impose a substantially greater burden upon
such commerce than would be the case if some such slight amount
of intrastate commerce were carried on. Accordingly, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo (concurred in by Mr. Justices Brandeis and Stone) seems more desirable. His reliance
upon the fact that the corporation had power to do intrastate
business, while perhaps somewhat technical, seems substantially
justifiable. This point is made explicit in the following language

in this dissenting opinion:
38 288 U. S. 218 (1933).
89 Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925); Alpha Portland
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 (1925).
40 287 U. S. 295 (1932). The later decision in this case, cited in note

9, supra,
had not yet been rendered.
41
Notes 39 and 40, supra.
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"Moreover, what was done under the franchise one day might not
be done under it the next. Another franchise tax would not be owing
for a year. In the meantime the appellant might transact its business
as it pleased. If some of its sales, however few and trifling, had
been made in broken packages, there would be no denial by any one
that the privilege of making them would be subject to taxation by
one measure or another. This court has never held that the measure
in such circumstances would be arbitrary and unlawful because determined by the value of all the local capital, and not merely the proportion necessary for sales in broken lots." 42

This line of cases, unfortunately, departs from the realistic
test which the Court had ordinarily applied in this problem of
state taxation of interstate commerce. In most of these commerce cases the Court explicitly, or at least impliedly, uses the
test of substantial burden rather than theoretical burden. There
is no more real justification for using the extreme doctrinal test
in this class of cases than in others, and it is to be hoped that
the Court will abandon its attempt to do so.
The folly of attempting to adhere to the doctrinal test is made
the more evident by the fact that the Court is compelled to admit
explicitly in many cases that there is always a burden upon interstate commerce if the taxpayer is at all engaged in such commerce, and that the problem is, therefore, one of degree; that
the burden cannot be entirely avoided, though it must not be
permitted to be too heavy. 43 Even an apparent discrimination
against interstate commerce may not invalidate a state tax if,
on analysis, the discrimination substantially disappears in fact.
This is made clear in State v. Wilson & Co.,4 a case coming up
from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, where the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without opinion "for want of
a substantial federal question." The state imposed a 134 per
cent tax on gross sales of meat and a much lower tax on slaughtering of animals in Louisiana. The apparent joker was that
the payment of the slaughtering tax exempted the taxpayer
from the payment of the higher gross sales tax. The defendant
claimed that the gross sales tax was, on its face, a discrimination against interstate commerce, since sales in Louisiana would
unquestionably in part result in interstate commerce, whereas
42288 U. S. 218, 235 (1933).
43 See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933).
44

(1934).

179 La. 648, 154 So. 636 (1934), appeal dismissed, 293 U. S. 518
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the slaughtering would, of course, take place entirely within the
state. The state court admitted that the tax was discriminatory on its face, but held that it could be sustained by construing
it so that the wholesale dealer always had to pay the tax on gross
sales. The lower tax on slaughtering was thus confined to one
who slaughtered but did not wholesale. The result was that
anyone who engaged in interstate commerce would have to pay
the higher tax whether or not he engaged in slaughtering in
Louisiana; therefore, there could be no discrimination against
interstate commerce. 45 As already stated, the Federal Supreme
Court accepted this view without deeming it necessary to write
a further opinion.
Another important case where a state tax concededly affecting interstate commerce was, nevertheless, sustained, is Wiloil
Corp. v. Pennsylvania.46 The taxpayer was a wholesale distributor of liquid fuels in Pennsylvania. It ordered fuel from
Delaware which was to be delivered to purchasers at Philadelphia or Essington, Pennsylvania. The price included the Pennsylvania tax on the use or sale of liquid fuels. In this litigation,
testing the validity of the tax on these shipments, the state court
held that the sale took place in Pennsylvania, and the taxpayer
did not dispute this. The state court, therefore, held the sales
subject to the Pennsylvania tax, and the Federal Supreme Court
affirmed this decision. The opinion, by Mr. Justice Butler,
pointed out that there was no discrimination against interstate
commerce by the tax, and furthermore, that, so far as the purchaser was concerned, no interstate commerce was required, as
the fuel could have been obtained from Pennsylvania sources.
It was further held to be immaterial that the products were
delivered in tank cars, which constitute original packages. The
following language from the opinion of the Court makes especially clear that the whole problem, at least disregarding the
question of actual discrimination, is a matter of degree:
"Our decisions show that, if goods carried from one State have
reached destination in another where they are held in original packages for sale, the latter has power without discrimination to tax them
as it does other property within its jurisdiction." 47
45

Cf. General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U. S. 367 (1926).

46 294 U. S. 169 (1935).
47 Id. at 175.
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On the other hand, Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. 48 holds invalid a state tax on a flat amount on each
telephone in the state, the tax being payable by the telephone
company. The ground for this decision is that the tax necessarily burdens interstate commerce to the degree that such commerce is carried on by the use of such telephones. The tax was
called by the statute, an "occupation tax," and the Court held
that it could be sustained as such, so far as intrastate business
was concerned. However, the tax "being indivisible and indiscriminate in its application, necessarily burdens interstate commerce." 40 It might be said that this is not an excessive tax,
even with respect to the intrastate business; but the answer is
that it must necessarily burden the interstate business, because
intrastate and interstate business are inseparable. 50 The remedy
of the state is to impose another form of taxation (for example,
on the gross receipts of the telephone company) -which will permit some division upon the intrastate and interstate business.
The ruling may seem harsh with respect to the state, but permission to tax in.this manner would enable the states to burden
interstate commerce almost without limit.
This review of the interstate commerce tax cases during this
period demonstrates that the Court has, in general, adhered to
the principles which it has previously applied, and has perhaps
made those principles even more explicit. These principles are
that the states may not by taxation discriminate against interstate commerce, nor substantially burden it; but that a state tax
will not be invalidated merely because, like practically any conceivable state tax, it may possibly affect interstate commerce.
Only with respect to corporate taxes upon foreign corporations
carrying on solely interstate activities within the state has any
substantial departure from these general principles been recognized in the last three years. It is to be hoped that this unfortunate doctrine will be brought to an end, or at least so minimized as to avoid its present effect in unjustly precluding state
taxation in that situation. On the whole, however, the Court
has, in general, reached a position in this whole matter which is
both logically defensible and practically desirable.
48294 U. S. 384 (1935).
49 Id. at 394.
50 Cf. Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921).
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The Intergovernonental Cases
In the cases involving state and federal taxation which is
alleged to burden improperly the activities of the other member
of our dual system, the test has been said to be somewhat
stricter. 51 Perhaps that is the case; nevertheless, the history
of the past three years has shown a definite tendency toward
applying the same practical test as has appeared in the inter-,
state commerce cases. In general, the Court has in the intergovernmental cases repudiated in fact, if not always in word, the
test of doctrinal immunity; the test is, as it ought to be, one of
practical burden.
It may be said in the first place that no matter how great the
right of the Federal Government to immunity from state taxation on its functions, such immunity may not only be given up
(at least with some limitations) but is also at least partly
dependent upon Congressional assertion of such immunity. The
Court has recently said that:
"Immunity of corporate government agencies from suit and judicial process, and their incidents, is less readily implied than immunity

from taxation."

52

But it is still true that such tax immunity can only result from
Congressional action, express or implied.
Thus, in Trotter v. Tennessee,53 it was held that a federal
statute, exempting moneys paid to war veterans by the United
States from state taxation, did not exempt real estate purchased
with such money. The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Cardozo, intimates that Congress could insist upon this further
exemption, but clearly holds that it has not, in fact, done so.
5
4 this idea was carried so far as to
And, in Gillis v. California,
hold that an oil company receiver appointed by a federal court
must comply with a law of Congress requiring the giving of a
bond to the state to insure the payment of state gasoline taxes.
In this case it appeared that the receiver was unable to give the
bond, but the Court only said that, if so, he must give up the
51 See Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 505 (1922), cited note 5,
supra.
52
Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 235 (1935).
58 290 U. S. 354 (1933).
54293 U. S. 62 (1934).
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business. The Court admitted that the effect of the Congressional Act was substantially to give priority to the state tax,
but stated that this was within the power of Congress.
On the other hand, it was held that California could not tax
sales of gasoline to the Post Exchange at the Presidio at San
Francisco. 55 Here the Court found that the state had ceded this
property absolutely (with the exception of service of state
process) to the United States, and had, therefore, precluded
itself from imposing any tax upon, or with respect to, activities
within the boundaries of the property.
Though authorities on the point seem to be lacking, at least
during this period, the same general rules would seem to apply
to the necessity of state action in asserting, or perhaps explicitly
giving up, immunity from federal taxation upon its agencies.
In either case, however, it would seem that an intention to assert
all the tax immunity possible would usually be a reasonable and
fair implication, in the absence of express language to the
contrary.
However, there is at least one situation where the tax immunity does not seem to be reciprocal. This is, that state
activities not regarded by the Court as carrying on a strictly
governmental function, are not exempt from federal taxation,
no matter how direct is the state action in question. This principle, first applied to a state liquor business many years ago in
South Carolina v. United States, 56 was reiterated during this
period as to the same activity in Ohio v. Helvering.57 The Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, said:
"If a state chooses to go into the business of buying and selling
commodities, its right to do so may be conceded so far as the Federal
Constitution is concerned; but the exercise of the right is not the
performance of a governmental function, and must find its support
in some authority apart from the police power. When a state enters
the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far,

at least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." 58
This is all very well; and it must be conceded that state
socialism might, if state immunity from taxation was literally
55 Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U. S. 242 (1934).
56199 U. S. 437 (1905).
57292 U. S. 360 (1934).
58Id. at 369.
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applied, result in no scope being left for the federal taxing
power. 50 Still, it seems that the argument is not altogether
applicable in this situation. It is absurd to contend that a state
government which carries on the liquor business is doing so
exclusively for reasons of revenue. One obvious and important
purpose is to regulate and limit the business, exactly as private
liquor business is regulated, in the interest of public health,
order, and good morals. The bland assumption of the Court that
immunity in this case means logically the possibility of total
immunity of all activities within the state from federal taxation
is subject not only to the criticism that it is another application
of the well-known "parade of imaginary horribles," but also that
it is not even applicable, in that such regulation is not a real step
toward state socialism.
Furthermore, if this is a justifiable restriction upon state
immunity from federal taxation, it would seem that the rule
would work both ways, and that the states would be entitled to
tax federal activities not strictly governmental. As yet, however, the federal officials have absolutely denied such state power
of taxation, even in activities having far less connection with
traditional governmental functions than liquor regulation. So
far as judicial decision upon this point is concerned, however,
it seems entirely in the future, at least so far as the Supreme
Court is concerned.
However, in adhering to this doctrine, the Court held in
Helvering v. Powers 60 that the compensation of the trustees of
the Boston Elevated Railway was subject to federal income tax,
even though the state (Massachusetts) had taken over the operation of the railroad, and the trustees were concededly state officers. The Court, relying upon the cases already cited in this
connection, holds that the state itself would have been directly
taxable on such income and therefore had no difficulty in holding that the plaintiffs, as trustees, were taxable.
Some slight, but very slight, weakening of this concept
appears in A. Magnano Co. 4. Hamilton,61 where, however, the
state did not carry on the activity in question (the manufacture
and sale of oleomargarine) but rather taxed it. The Court held
59 This idea is emphasized in South Carolina v. United States, 199
U. S. 437 (1905).
60 293 U. S. 214 (1934).
61292 U. S. 40 (1934).
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that such a tax did not unconstitutionally interfere with the taxing power of the United States, merely because it was intended
to, and might actually wipe out the oleomargarine industry in
the state, and thereby eliminate that source of federal taxation.
The truth seems to be that this alleged tax, being intended us
prohibitive, is actually an exercise of the police power of a state
rather than a taxing power.
Another limitation on intergovernmental immunity from
taxation, and one which seems to be applied reciprocally, is the
refusal to exempt a mere independent contractor. Thus, a tax
by Louisiana on the use of gasoline in the state was sustained,
even as applied to a contractor with the Federal Government
who used the gasoline exclusively in carrying out that contract,
for the construction of levees. 62 The opinion, by Mr. Justice
Butler, lays much stress upon the rigidity of intergovernmental
immunity from taxation, saying:
"The appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the contracts
are federal means or instrumentalities, that the enactments referred
to impose a direct burden upon them and that the State was without
power to impose the tax. And on that basis it seeks to invoke the rule

that, consistently with the Federal Constitution, a State may not tax
the operations of an instrument employed by the government of the
Union to carry its powers into operation. That principle, while not
expressly stated in the Constitution, necessarily arises out of our dual
government. It has often been given effect. And reciprocally it safeguards every State against federal tax on its governmental agencies
or operations. Its application does not depend upon the amount of the
exaction, the weight of the burden or the extent of the resulting interference with sovereign independence. Where it applies, the principle
is an absolute one wholly unaffected by matters or distinctions of
degree. Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 575, and
cases cited. Its right application is essential to the orderly conduct
of the national and the state governments and the attainment of
justice as between them." 63

But all this roaring quickly becomes as gentle as a sucking
dove when the Court actually goes on to hold that the burden
upon the Federal Government is too remote to justify immunity.
This idea is buttressed by pointing out that the machinery itself
could concededly be taxed by the state. This is all true, and it is
good sense. Nevertheless, the result is a denial of that doc62 Trinityfarm Constr. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 (1934).
631d. at 470-471.

19361

FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION

trinal immunity which the Court so strenuously and vociferously
(but only verbally) asserts in the above question.
This doctrine that an independent contractor with the United
States normally is not exempt from state taxation (and presumably vice versa) is reiterated in several cases coming up
from state or federal district courts sitting locally, which the
Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. 64 The most interesting and important of these cases is Tirrell v. Johnston,65 coming
up from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The opinion
in the state court was extremely long, elaborate and carefully
reasoned, reaching the conclusion that a rural mail carrier, paid
by the government at so much a mile, is subject to New Hampshire gasoline tax for gasoline thus used by him in his car. The
opinion first argues at some length that this tax is not a tax but
a payment for services rendered. This does not seem very convincing, and the court largely abandons it in connection with
the second argument, which is much more forceful. This argument assumes that this exaction is a tax, but contends that it is
still a question of degree, and that there is no direct or substantial burden on the Federal Government. It is explicitly
pointed out that the government pays the man just so much,
irrespective of how much tax he pays to the state.
It might be answered that the government could supposedly
reduce its payment to the carrier if he were immune from state
taxation. Indeed, this is the only method of sustaining Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 66 where the Court, several years ago,
held that sales of gasoline made by the plaintiff to the United
States for use of the Coast Guard and a Veterans' Hospital,
were immune from state taxation. This was a five to four decision, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes has acquired a lasting fame from his rather curt remark that "The
power to tax is not the power to destroy, while this Court sits." 67
64

American Airways, Inc., v. Wallace, 57 F. (2d) 887 (M. D. Tenn.
1932), aff'd without opinion, 287 U. S. 565 (1932) ; American Airways, Inc.
v. Grosjean, 3 F. Supp. 995 (E. D. La. 1933), aff'd without opinion, 290 U. S.
596 (1933); General Constr. Co. v. Fisher, 36 P. (2d) 358 (Ore. 1934),
appeal dismissed for want of a substantialfederal question, 295 U. S. 715

(1935).
65 86 N. H. 530, 171 Atl. 641 (1934), aff'd without opinion, 293 U. S.

533 (1934).
66 277 U. S. 218 (1928).
67 Id. at 223.
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Of course such purchasers are rather more direct federal
agencies than in the New Hampshire case, but the actual burden
on the Federal Government is hardly greater, or more direct.
The New Hampshire court in its opinion criticized the Panhandle Oil case, and says that it thinks the doctrine of that case
should not be extended. It seems difficult to reconcile these
cases on any realistic basis, and, in affirming the New Hampshire court without opinion, the Supreme Court seems, in fact,
to have overruled the Panhandle Oil case. At any rate, the doctrine of Tirrell v. Johnston seems much more desirable.
Even more clearly should such tax immunity be absolutely
denied where the taxpayer's activities, while carried on under a
license of the state or Federal Government, as the case may be,
is yet primarily for his own private advantage. This proposition, already clearly enunciated in previous cases, 8 was reiterated, during the period now under consideration, in Broad River
Power Co. v. Query.69 Here the plaintiff was subject to a South
Carolina excise tax on the generation of electricity by water
power. The plaintiff claimed immunity, on the ground that it
was acting under a license of the Federal Power Commission.
The Court held, however, that the plaintiff was acting for its own
benefit, and not as an agent of the United States. Accordingly,
the state tax was unobjectionable. The same result was reached
in Federal Compress Co. v. McLean,70 where the taxpayer was
carrying on its business of compressing and forwarding cotton
under a federal license. This, too, was held not to give any immunity from state taxation.
Another prolific cause of litigation of this general scope is
state taxation of national banks. It is clear that such banks are
agencies of the Federal Government, and that as such they are
immune from state taxation, except to the extent that such taxation is permitted by Congress.7 1 However, the Congressional
statute7 2 withdrawing in part such immunity, and thereby subjecting the banks to state taxation, has in recent years been
much broadened. But such state taxation is still definitely
limited.
68

See Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm., 283 U. S. 291
(1931).
69288 U. S. 178 (1933).
70 291 U. S. 17 (1934).
71 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
7213 STAT. 99, 111-112 (1864), as amended by 15 STAT. 34 (1868), 12
U. S. C. A. § 548 (1926).
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In Domenech v. National City Bank,7 s it was held that this
statute limited the power of a territory (Puerto Rico) to tax the
branch of a national bank in that territory; that the taxing
power of a territory was limited exactly the same as that of a
state. The Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Roberts, said:
"Puerto Rico, an island possession, like a territory, is an agency
of the federal government, having no independent sovereignty comparable to that of a state in virtue of which taxes may be levied.
Authority to tax must be derived from the United States. But like
a state, though for a different reason, such an agency may not tax
a federal instrumentality. A state, though a sovereign, is precluded
from so doing because the Constitution requires that there be no interference by a state with the powers granted to the federal government.
A territory or a possession may not do so because the dependency
may not tax its sovereign. True the Congress may consent to such
taxation; but the grant to the Island of a general power to tax should
not be construed as a consent. Nothing less than act of Congress
clearly and explicitly conferring the privilege will suffice. Not only
do we find no such statutory consent but we are confronted by R. S.
5219, which proprio vigore extends to territories, and the Congressional
declaration that it, like other statutes of the United States shall, if
not locally inapplicable, apply to Puerto Rico." 74

While it is well-settled that the states may not discriminate
against national banks by taxing them at a higher rate than
other capital actually competing with the national banks is
taxed, 75 the Court has recently reiterated the proposition that a
state tax will not be invalidated upon this ground unless actual
competition is shown, and to a substantial amount.7 6 The mere
power of a national bank to go into activities carried on by more

lightly taxed capital does not invalidate the tax on the bank,
unless it is shown that the bank actually exercises this power.
On the other hand, the strict prohibition against the states'
discrimination against national banks may result in the necessity
of discrimination in their favor. This is shown by Union Bankc

& Trust Co. v. Phelps.7 7 Here the plaintiff was a state bank of
deposit.

It was subjected to a tax on its stock, which was not

imposed on various other state financial institutions which substantially competed with it.

The state statute imposing the tax

73294 U. S. 199 (1935).
741d. at 204-205.

75First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 341 (1926).
76 First Nat'l Bank v. Louisiana Tax Comm., 289 U. S.60 (1933).
77288 U. S.181 (1933).
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purported to tax national bank stock in the same way; but this
provision was stricken out as contrary to the Federal Constitution by the state supreme court, and the state authorities acquiesced, thus, in practice, exempting national banks entirely
from this tax. On appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, it was
held that the plaintiff had no grounds for complaint. The Court
said that the discrimination as regards other state institutions
may have been justified, because of the circumstances, and certainly was not shown to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
More important for our purposes, the Court held that the discrimination with respect to national banks was actually compulsory. The Court, speaking of national banks, said:
"Such instrumentalities are exempted from state taxation without
the express consent of Congress, by the Federal Constitution. They
are of a class wholly distinct from the property of ordinary corporations or individuals, and this fact cannot be disregarded by the State.
If the State sees fit to tax unrestricted property within her jurisdiction
and to omit National Bank shares, the classification cannot be said to
be arbitrary and wholly unreasonable-the basis of it is plain enough.
It may be vastly more important for the State to omit National Bank
shares and tax ordinary moneyed capital according to a plan not permissible in respect of National Bank shares rather than conform to
the standard prescribed by Congress. There is nothing to indicate
that Congress ever supposed that mere establishment of a National
Bank within a State could upset the scheme for taxation, theretofore
entirely proper, by producing conflict with the XIV Amendment. This
view would subject the taxing power of the State to the will of Congress far beyond what is necessary for the protection of federal
agencies. The constitutional inhibition against taxing these agencies
does not abridge the taxing power of the several States in respect of
other property. The implied exemption is a shield for federal agencies-not the source of congressional power to control State action
in respect of other matters." 7s

The situation with respect to national banks, then, is one
which seems reasonably fair to the states; but if it is not, Congress alone can change the situation. As to state banking and
other financial institutions, the situation may not be so fair; but
here again the Court is helpless. If there is any substantial
unfairness, only Congress can cure it, for it is clear that the
states may not tax national banks at all, except under, and to
the extent of, express Congressional permission.
7

8 Id. at 187.
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With respect to state taxation affecting Indians, the situation may not be quite the same, because of the imperative necessity of careful federal protection of the Indians against probably
unfriendly local activities. 79 As to federal taxation of the Indians and their property (which, of course, does not really affect
intergovernmental relations), there would seem to be a moral
obligation at least to limit such taxation, but certainly there is
no legal obligation which the courts can enforce. Thus, it was
recently held that income from investments of funds received
from Indian lands is subject to federal income tax. 0 In fact,
there seems no reason why the Indians should have as complete
immunity from taxation as they claimed in that case; at any
rate the Court has sustained practically complete subjection of
the Indians to federal income tax.8 '
With respect to state taxation, the only case found during
this period is Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board.82 Here it was
held that the State of Oklahoma could impose a property tax on
oil produced on restricted Indian lands on which the royalty to
the Indian owners had been paid. The principal difficulty in
reaching this result was the previous decision in JaybirdMining
Co. v. Weir,83 where it was held that ore taken from restricted
Indian property, under the terms of a governmental lease, was
not subject to the ordinary state property tax so long as in the
hands of the lessee. This case was distinguished from the
Indian Territory Oil Co. case on the ground that the Indian
superintendent had actually been paid, so that there was no
possible burden upon the United States. The Court said in the
latter case:
"Such immunity as petitioner enjoyed as a governmental instrumentality inhered in its operations as such, and being for the protection
of the Government in its function extended no farther than was necessary for that purpose." 8 4

79 See Brown, The Taxation of Indian Property (1931) 15 MINN. L.
REv. 182.
50 Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 U. S.
418 (1935).
81 Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691 (1931).
82288 U. S.325 (1933).
83271 U. S.609 (1926).
84288 U. S.325, 328 (1933).
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It is submitted, however, that the case represents at least a step
in the opposite direction from the Weir case,8 5 which should
probably be overruled, on the ground that the burden upon the
United States, as regards its Indian wards, is too theoretical
and, at any rate, unsubstantial to justify a complete denial of
the state power to tax.
Another case involving leases, but this time a state lease--as
affecting federal taxes, was decided during this period. This
case was Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust. 6 The case arose as
follows: Oil was discovered on land owned by the City of Long
Beach, California, and used by it for its water supply. The petitioner secured an oil lease on the land, the oil to be sold by it
and the city jointly. The profits were to be shared, sixty per
cent to the petitioner and forty per cent to the city. The former
claimed immunity from federal income tax upon its share of the
proceedings, but this claim was denied by the Court. Much of
the argument of counsel seems to have been as to whether the
supplying of water is a governmental or a private function of
the city, but the Court does not decide this. Its conclusion is
predicated upon the very sensible ground that there cannot be
any real burden upon the city, since the city got its share of the
profits, no matter what taxes had to be paid by the petitioner on
its share. Still, it cannot be denied that there was at least a
theoretical burden upon the city, but the Court properly holds
that this is immaterial.
In New York ex rel. Northern Finance Co. v. Lynch,8 7 the
Court, without opinion, sustained a New York franchise tax
measured by corporate net income which included interest from
United States bonds and dividends from national banks. The
decision is clearly contrary to the famous-or perhaps notorious
-case of Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts,8 holding that a state
may not compel a corporation to pay an income tax upon that
part of its income derived from United States bonds and Federal Farm Loan bonds held by it. However, the Macallen case
had already been substantially overruled in a decision previous
85271 U.:S. 609 (1926).
86288 U. S. 508 (1933).
87262 N. Y. 477, 188 N. E. 27 (1933),
opinion, 290 U. S. 601 (1933).
88279 U. S. 620 (1929).

(memorandum), aff'd without
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to the period under consideration.8 9 The Northern Finance
Company case is, therefore, only another spadeful of earth
thrown upon the grave of the Macallen case. It is to be hoped
that the Court will soon entirely close the grave by explicitly
overruling that most unfortunate decision.
Only one other case on this topic remains for discussion; but
this is perhaps the most significant of all. It is Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United States.90 The facts
of the case were that the University of Illinois imported certain
scientific apparatus for use in its laboratories, both for teaching and for research purposes. Upon this importation, a duty
was xacted, against the protests of the University authorities.
Suit was subsequently brought by the University to recover the
amount of the tariff which it had thus been compelled to pay.
It would seem, at least at first glance, that this is nearly an
open-and-shut case of where the tax was improper. There was
a direct burden upon a corporate agency of the state carried on
exclusively for educational purposes. No one would seriously
contend that education is not a governmental function of a state;
indeed, the Supreme Court did not attempt to rely upon any such
absurd proposition as this. And yet the Court upheld the collection of the tariff, upon the somewhat surprising ground that the
tariff is a regulation of foreign commerce, and not a tax.
Two excerpts from the opinion, written for a unanimous
Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, will make sufficiently clear
the principle upon which it proceeded. These are as follows:
"The principle of duality in our system of government does not
touch the authority of the Congress in the regulation of foreign
commerce." 91
"The principle invoked by the petitioner, of the immunity of state
instrumentalities from federal taxation, has its inherent limitations.
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 128. It is a principle implied
from the necessity of maintaining our dual system of government ....
Springing from that necessity it does not extend beyond it. Protecting the functions of government in its proper province, the implica8

This case was cited
in their memoCourts
the
Federal
Supreme
by both the New York and
randa in New York ex rel. Northern Finance Co. v. Lynch, supra note 87.
For a further discussion of Pacific Co. v. Johnson, supra, see Brown, supra
note 7, 81 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 247, 258 et seq.
90 289 U. S.48 (1933).
91 Id. at 57.

9Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S.480 (1932).
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tion ceases when the boundary of that province is reached. The fact
that the State in the performance of state functions may use imported
articles does not mean that the importation is a function of the state
government independent of federal power. The control of importation
does not rest with the State but with the Congress. In international
relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people
of the United States act through a single government with unified and
adequate national power. There is thus no violation of the principle
which petitioner invokes, for there is no encroachment on the power
of the State as none exists with respect to the subject over which the
92
federal power has been exerted."

From one point of view this is a distinctly realistic decision.
Everyone knows that the chief, though undoubtedly not the sole,
purpose of our tariffs is not to raise revenue but to protect our
supposedly weak infant industries. This fundamental purpose,
it may well be said, cannot be permitted to be interfered with
even for the benefit of strictly governmental activities of the
states.
However, this argument may also lead to an absurdity, as
has been pointed out by the counsel for the University in that
case. 93 Accepting the doctrine of South Carolina v. United
States, 94 and applying it to other state functions, what is to prevent the United States from completely taxing certain or all state
functions out of existence under the guise'of regulating foreign-or possibly even interstate---commerce? The case certainly does open up rather startling possibilities from this point
of view.
It is improbable, however, that these results will be actually
reached, at least within the very near future. The Court was
chiefly thinking that the real purpose of tariffs is not to raise
revenue, and that, therefore, a state should no more be permitted to evade tariffs than it would be permitted, say, to
import explosives for its own use without complying with federal restrictions in the interest of public safety. As already
said, the concept of the tariff as a non-revenue regulation of our
foreign commercial relations has a certain basis of realism,
though by no means completely so. If the case is to be supported, however, it seems that it can only rest upon that founda92 Id. at 59.

93Sveinbjorn Johnson, Federal Taxation Affecting State Instrumentalities (1934) 68 U. S. L. REv. 248, 261 et seq.
94199 U. S. 437 (1905).
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tion. As a tax case, it certainly permits the Federal Government to impose a direct and substantial, and therefore unjustified, burden upon an important governmental function of a
state.
Conclusion
The past three years have shown a tendency with respect to
these topics which, in general, is in accordance with, and to some
extent even more distinct than, the previous authorities. With
respect to interstate commerce, the Court has, in general, adhered to the sensible, though perhaps somewhat illogical, position which it has previously taken; namely, that a state tax is
not to be invalidated merely because it affects interstate commerce, but rather that it is to be sustained unless it discriminates against such commerce or at least burdens it to a substantial degree. The only case decided during this period which
seems difficult to reconcile with that general theory is AngloChilean Corp. v. Alabama,95 which reiterated the unfortunate
doctrine that a foreign corporation, authorized to do business
in the state, but which confines its activities to interstate or
foreign commerce, is entirely immune from any license tax by
the state. Here is an application of the doctrinal immunity
which the Court has otherwise not in fact adhered to.
With respect to taxation in intergovernmental relations, the
same tendency is evident. No longer does the Court apparently
make any appreciable distinction between interstate commerce
and intergovernmental relations. In both situations, the test is
the practical one of discrimination and substantial burden rather
than the theoretical one of possible effect. Even direct tax burdens upon non-governmental activities are permitted, at least so
far as the Federal Government is taxing state activities. In the
University of Illinois case,96 indeed, a direct burden by the Federal Government upon a governmental activity of the state was
permitted upon the somewhat dubious theory that the tariff is
not a tax but a regulation of foreign commerce.
On the whole, however, the Court seems to be going in the
right direction with respect to these problems. Interstate commerce is entitled to be protected from state taxation which is
discriminatory or substantially burdensome; and both state gov95 288 U. S. 218 (1933).

96 289 U. S. 48 (1933).
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ernments and the Federal Government are to be protected from
the other side with respect to taxes which directly and substantially discriminate against, or substantially burden, their own
necessary governmental activities. Beyond this, the Court ought
not to go; for. to do so means not protection of the nation and
the states, but potential destruction of one, or both, of them. It
seems that the Court has really seen and applied this principle,
even though it sometimes talks as if it had not. The decisions,
in general, take the intermediate position, which may be difficult to justify in logic, but which is not only practical but necessary if the states and nation are to continue to exist and operate
separately.

